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Topic: The Ogaden War from 1977-78 (Read 6099 times)
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cuba
Newbie
Posts: 49
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Was this war a defeat for Somaly?
Check this article.
Ogaden Crisis
Prior to the Ogaden War, Somalia had been allied with the Soviet Union, and its relations with the United States were strained.
As chaos spread throughout Ethiopia after Haile Selassie's downfall, Somalia increased its support to several pro-Somali liberation groups in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. After the Somali government committed Army troops to the Ogaden, the conflict ceased to be a guerrilla action and assumed the form of a conventional war in which armor, mechanized infantry, and air power played decisive roles. By mid-September 1977, Ethiopia conceded that 90 percent of the Ogaden was in Somali hands.
The Soviet Union's decision to abandon Somalia in favor of Ethiopia eventually turned the tide of battle in the Ogaden. From October 1977 through January 1978, about 20,000 Somali guerrillas and troops pressed attacks on Harer, where nearly 50,000 Ethiopians had regrouped, backed by Soviet-supplied armor and artillery and gradually reinforced by 11,000 Cubans and 1,500 Soviet advisers. As expected, in early February 1978 Ethiopian and Cuban forces launched a two-stage counterattack. Within a week, Ethiopia had retaken all of the Ogaden's major towns, and on March 9, 1978, Somali forces were recalled from Ethiopia.
American interests in the region derived from the strategic location of the Horn of Africa on the Suez and Cape oil routes. The prospect of the Soviets dominating both Somalia and Ethiopia created considerable political concern in the United States, although the crisis for the US was one of confidence rather than one of substance. Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski went so far as to declare that "SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden", signifying the death of détente. In late February 1978, surface ships from MIDEASTFOR began surveillance operations of the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Following the collapse of the Somali army in the Ogaden, the Kitty Hawk CVBG was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore. Brzezinski advocated sending an aircraft carrier battle group into the Red Sea to shore up the Somali position. On 23 March 1978 the Kitty Hawk CVBG was released without having been sent into the Indian Ocean. The actual deployment of the group of small warships in the Red Sea remained an expressive display of force unproductive of identifiable advantage.
Largely because the Soviet Union sided with Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, a United States-Somali rapprochement began in 1977 and culminated in a military access agreement in 1980 that permitted the United States to use naval ports and airfields at Berbera, Chisimayu, and Mogadishu, in exchange for military and economic aid.
I would like to know opinions about this war.
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Baybers
Sr. Member
Posts: 370
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this war was a defeat for somalia. there were major gains made by somali militias from zone 5 against ethiopian forces, it may have been wiser to supply ammunition and 'advisers'.
it was myopic of somalia to commit itself openly to war with ethiopia without addressing the consequences. there were warnings given to somalia that the soviet union would not be idle if it were to invade ethiopia. somalia had become giddy by the gains that it had made and thought that nothing could stop it from now attaining its goals. the fact is that making gains in military conquests is not all you have to be able to defend those gains for the long term.
the great ahmed guray had practically captured all of ethiopia in his time, chasing the ruler of ethiopia from point to point. he spread fear and respect in the hearts of the ethiopians such that to this day they still eat raw meat not knowing that their ancestors took to eating raw meat so that the fires that would cook it would not attract the somalis. eventually the ethiopians called on the portugese to fight in their place and to secure their existence. even though half their number was slain by the somalis, it was this overwhelming force that delivered the ethiopians.
in the western somalia war of 1977 there was a similarly overwhelming force brought to bear against the somalis, on this occasion the cubans. the cubans specialised in fighting any war where marxist revolutionaries were in peril and they traveled throughout the world in this pursuit. the somalis were not defeated by ethiopians but by their own feeling of superiority and their inability to see the writing on the wall, that ethiopia cannot fight its way out of a paper bag but always relies on external assistance.
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Dalmar1
Moderator
Full Sr Member
Gender: 
Posts: 2198
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....it may have been wiser to supply ammunition and 'advisers'.
I totally agree with you on that one. It would have more sense to maintain a strong rebel forces that could destabilize the Ethiopian forces—employing hit and run tactics—than committing the entire Somali Army into fighting in Ethiopia.
Somali rebel forces had the leverage of waging war in Western Somalia, where Ethiopians would had been trapped in a hostile territory. What’s more, Ethiopia may have hesitated launching an all out war against civilians, because that could have provoked Somalia’s formidable Army back then.
After rebels waged years of guerilla war against Ethiopia, that would had grabbed the attention of the international community, and Ethiopia could had been forced to accept a ceasefire by giving Western Somalia, at least, a full autonomy.
Was the Ogaden war a mistake? Is it what have caused Somalia to plunge headlong into disaster?
In 1977, the Somali Army was one of the strongest Armies in Africa. Its tank and armed carries out numbered their Ethiopians counter parts, and the Somali Air Force was a power to rekcon with.
With strong army, with too many Generals and colonels, Mr.Siad Barre had only one option; put the army into an action, or else it would turn against you. Why?
Well, put it this way; Somalia was not backed by the US and Mr. Barre knew that the Soviet Union would not allow the SNA (Somali National Army) to overrun Ethiopia; moreover, as said by Baybers, throughout Ethiopian’s history, every time, they were in deep trouble, they have been rescued by foreign forces(non-Africans). So, then the question is: Was Siad Barre liberating Western Somalia or was he saving his ass?
He knew that he could overrun the Ethiopian Army, but he would not be able to retain the region. So, then what was the point of attacking the Somali region of Ethiopia?
As it turned out, when the SNA was evicted from Ethiopia, a group of young military officers, led by the current leader of Somalia, Mr. Abdullahi Yussuf, attempted a coup d'état against Mr. Barre. So, this tells me, if Mr. Barre didn’t wage a war against Ethiopia, the SNA officers would have attempted to overthrow him anyway. So, in fact, he kept them busy for a while.
As soon as the war was over, Somalia’s down fall started unfolding. Somalia supposed to be a self-sufficient country by 1980. But because of the Ogaden war, Somali never recovered.
It is noteworthy to mention, in 1978, at the height of the Ogaden war the SNA reached Nazaret- small town 98km from Addis Ababa.
Since then, the tide has turned against Somalis. In 2006, twenty eight years later, the Ethiopians are in Jawhar-small town 90km from Muqdisho.
I couldn’t disagree that history is weird.
On a positive note, the Ogaden war reminded the Ethiopians and the rest of the world that Somalis would NEVER give up Western Somalia. Sooner or later, the region must be given an autonomy, and eventually, that would lead to independence. Otherwise, history may repeat itself, and another Ogaden war might be inventible.
Peace.
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xPo
Full Sr Member
Gender:
Posts: 571
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The vision of a Greater Somalia had always been there as it is still there by this day today, Insha'Allah. Somalia going to war was first the culmination of the peak of somali military's muscle-strength capabilities and that of Ethiopia in a state of political turmoil. These were the two key factors which caused Somalia to go on war.
On the other hand, there was finally a job for all these reluctant generals and colonels who were mostly based in and around Mogadishu, who Siad Barre from the beginning saw them as a threat to his power and always wanted to keep them away and busy. With the war was imminent, he so managed to transfer most of them to the frontier with Ethiopia prior to the war.
Anyway, the war was lost due to its militarily unbalanced nature, you know all the help they were getting from Cuba, CCPP, Yeman etc... This was a big blow to the regime, which now started to realize it was a big mistake on their side to choose the military option to solve the issue and that of, the vision of greater Somalia was now dead. Had been this war won by Somalia, then this will have been a case study for Kenya as well. That’s was not the case though, Siad Barre had to visit Kenya to indicate that his government no longer had any claim to Kenyan territory.
Now these things belongs in the past (History), however, I am sure that the strategically and geopolitically miscalculation of the situation by the Somali government and the lack of any counterbalance, a backbone to rely on, resulted the ultimate defeat and humiliation. This was a big political gamble on Somalia's side. And the outcome was that Somalia lost the war and thereby the beginning of regime's downfall and the birth of numerous rebels, who helped nothing but continuing deterioration of the anarchistic situation and the political turmoil of country ever since the regime been overthrown.
So now we put aside the vision of a Greater Somalia as we now struggling to recover from decades of civil war. And currently where Ethiopia and Kenya are said to be campaigning tirelessly on how to get Somalia back on its feet seems to me something truly unfeasible. 
Illaahoow inoo gargaar!
xpo
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Baybers
Sr. Member
Posts: 370
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dalmar and xpo
had somalia kept its regular forces out of ethiopia and supplied elite forces as advicers and ellicit weapons, weapons that if caught would not give away the purchaser, it would have had a great success. as long as there is the perception that this is an internal struggle within ethiopia no external players could influence the situation. if any external players were foolish enough to intervene somalia would be within its rights to table a motion at the UN whilst announcing that it would not be a silent witness to such aggresion against ethnic somalis. eventually ethiopia would have to come to an understanding with the WSLF or whichever group was seen as having influence in the area, whether it be autonomy or whatever other arrangement.
'With strong army, with too many Generals and colonels, Mr.Siad Barre had only one option; put the army into an action, or else it would turn against you. Why?'
dalmar, very good point but take it one stage further. as you have said the SNA officers could have lead a coup against siad barre, after all this is what he had done himself. siad barre wanted to purge the senior officers of the SNA as he saw them as a threat to him whilst at the same time reducing the SNA so it could be more easily managed. therefore he saw the war as a two for one offer, set the SNA against the ethiopians to keep them from destabilising him and hopefully in the process a great number of the senior officers would be killed. could this have had an influence in the war as officers who needed support may not have got it in time in the hopes that they would be overun?
where i disagree is on the present and future state of western somalia. 1977 was the swan song for somalia, the point at which the resultant outcome would permanently shape the future. i believe that this region and the haud are probably gone for good in that the people of these regions are transforming to a new identity which places them within their present geographical limits. once a people take an active part in the process of electing the leadership of the nation in which they live, the war has been won on a psychological level. both communities of somalis living in zone 5 and in northern kenya have actively and enthusiastically voted in these countries elections. a people beaten psychologically are worse off than those beaten militarily. once these people saw that at its height the nation that they owed their allegiance to could not guarantee their salvation they started to invest in a new reality, namely ethiopia and kenya.
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cuba
Newbie
Posts: 49
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I have something to say:The SNA didnt retreat from Ogaden in 1978,they left small units there.
Look at this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ogaden_War
What happened to WSLF after Ogaden war?
By May 1980, the rebels, with the assistance of a small number of SNA soldiers who continued to help the guerilla war, controlled a substantial region of the Ogaden. However by 1981 the insurgents were reduced to sporadic hit-and-run attacks and were finally defeated.
Do you agree with it?
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Awrliqe
Guest
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I see there is a some historic revisionism going here. U guys seem to have conveniently omitted Barre`s use of clan manipulation and discrimination undermining the whole cause for liberation in Western Somali. This blatant bias led to the eventual formation of clan based and regional opposition which in turn led to the failed state we have today. For example, there was a blatant bias against non-Darood clans in WSLF which alienated many somalis especially in somali galbeed. This included arming only daroods especially ogadens and refusing weapons to other clans like Isaaq, Hawiye, Samaroon, Issa, Dir, and others. Even the use of the darood clan name "ogaden" for the whole region which inhabited by all somali clans was considered an insult. So u see there was more at play here than just good old Cold War geopolitics.
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Awrliqe
Guest
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Kubaan naasdheer,
By 1980 the WSLF was no longer fighting the Ethiopians but were being used by the Barre regime as a proxy militia to oppress innocent Somali civilians especially in Somaliland. The resistance to the WSLF by the people of Somaliland led to the formation of "Afaraad" , an indigenous Somalilander militia, which in turn became the first guerrilla fighting unit for the SNM or Somali National Movement. The WSLF were a bunch tribalist bandits by the 1980s who engaged robbery, murder, rape, and extortion against the unarmed population of Somaliland at the behest of Darood dominated Barre regime. Hence they had to be resisted and were eventually expelled from Somaliland by the SNM in 1991 after a bitter 10year war in wich tens of thousands died and whole cities destroyed by aerial bombardment including the use of white South African mercenary pilots. So u see Barre had no genuine desire to liberate western somalis. His agenda was dominance for his clan at the expense of other Somalis by any means. And I say this as a Somalilander of Wester Somali heritage. My clan, the Akishe/Dir are from near Jigjiga the regional capital and the scene of most of the worst battles of the 1977 war. In fact, my own father died in that war along with numerous uncles and cousins. My father belonged SNA and died at the major tank battle of Mt. Karamardha near Jigjiga.
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cuba
Newbie
Posts: 49
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If you read the article,you see WSLF controlled almost 60% of Ogaden in 1980.
What happened to this guerrilla after 1980?
Were they defeated by Ethiopians?
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Awrliqe
Guest
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cuba,
i think i explained to u why the wslf disintegrated in the above post. the wslf in essence became a proxy clan militia for the barre regime and hence lost any nationalist credentials it ever had. secondly it became deeply embroiled in the counterinsurgency against the SNM rebels. the wslf and ogadeni clan refugees became the object of intense resentment by the local population of somaliland. btw why do u need to know all this? since ur obviously not a somali. are u working for some western intelligence agency? 
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Dalmar1
Moderator
Full Sr Member
Gender:
Posts: 2198
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Baybers
I share your views about the peaceful approach to solving Western Somalia’s and NFD’s (Somali region of Kenya) problems.
I believe that we should continue what I call THE NATURAL PUSH of Somalis into the heartland of Africa.
Way before the Europeans trespassed into Africa’s territories; Somalis tribes were known to be fierce fighters that pushed Oramas, Ethiopians, and Kenyan tribes deeper into Africa.
Places like Gaalkacyo (a location where non-believers abandoned), Hargeysa (an Oroma word for a tree called Dacar in Somali. It has a bitter taste) indicate THE NATURAL PUSH of Somalis.
As soon as the Europeans arrived, the first thing they noticed was that Somalis-- a small population back then-- controlled a huge land (Dhulka Somali wayn = Great Somalia region ). What they also noticed was that Somalis did not mix with the rest of Africans, and they did not tolerate the non-Somali tribes to live with them in the same areas. The Europeans wanted to contain the expansion of the Somalis, and they divided Great Somalia into five regions.
Now, as you said, gaining back the Somali regions in Kenya and Ethiopia is not easy. So, what should we do?
We must employ three strategies to support THE NATURAL PUSH THEORY of Somalis.
1- As you have said, democracy should be introduced in those regions, and Somalis should be encouraged to get involved in politics in Ethiopia and Kenya. This can be done easily. Also, Somalis in those regions should be encouraged to stay in their regions and develope it as well. The free countries of Great Somalia, e.g. Somaliland, Somalia and Djibouti, should pour millions of dollars into those region in order to strengthen the Somali power in those regions.
2- Ethiopia should be made dependant on Somali ports. Furthermore, Ethiopia should be made dependant on Somali energy and Somali corporate. Also, Somalis should dominated both Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s economy.
3- The free Somali countries should maintain superior military forces with integrated air defense system, missile technology and a formidable air power. This should be done while maintaining a good relationship with Ethiopia and Kenya. The objective is not to attack Ethiopia and Kenya, but is to trap them into buying lots of weapons in order to keep up with the Somali military build up. This would drain them financially, and eventually, would force them into a total financial collapse.
4- Also, massive education should be introduced to the Somali regions of Ethiopia and Kenya. In fact, they should learn Amharic and Swahili languages as well.
Once everything falls in place, the Somali people in those regions can afford to have peaceful pro-independence groups. Eventually, Ethiopia and Kenya would be forced to give the Somalis a full autonomy where they will have full control of their regions and its resources. This will, eventually, lead to the break away of the Somali regions in Ethiopia and Kenya, and that is how THE NATURAL PUSH THEORY works.
What we could not gain by the bullet can be gained by the ballot.[/i]
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Awliqe
You have brought up a very interesting and appropriated discussion that we some how neglected to address. It would be nice, if you can shed light on how Mr. Barre used the Colonial policy: Divide and rule.
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Cuba
What happened to WSLF after Ogaden war?
WSLF disappeared into a thin air after ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) surfaced. The commanders of WSLF were dumfounded when ONLF was established. The ONLF defeated the whole purpose of the war.
Many Somalis believe that ONLF was created by the Ethiopian secret service agency. The Ethiopian objective was to weaken the Somali unity once the Somali rebel forces adapts a name that associates with a tribe. The strategy has been working effectively.
Peace.
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